The  Transient Rule  of Personal Jurisdiction: A Well-Intentioned Concept That Has Overstayed Its Welcome by Spitz, Joel H.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 73
Issue 1 Fall 1989 Article 7
The "Transient Rule" of Personal Jurisdiction: A
Well-Intentioned Concept That Has Overstayed Its
Welcome
Joel H. Spitz
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Joel H. Spitz, The "Transient Rule" of Personal Jurisdiction: A Well-Intentioned Concept That Has Overstayed Its Welcome, 73 Marq. L. Rev.
181 (1989).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol73/iss1/7
THE "TRANSIENT RULE9 OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION: A WELL-INTENTIONED
CONCEPT THAT HAS OVERSTAYED
ITS WELCOME
I. INTRODUCTION
In Pennoyer v. Neff, 1 the United States Supreme Court deemed that ser-
vice of process on an individual physically present in the forum is a suffi-
cient basis for the state to exercise in personam jurisdiction.2 This concept,
generally known as "transient jurisdiction,"3 has been upheld over the past
111 years based on the simple rationale that a state has complete authority
over persons and things within its borders.4 After Pennoyer, courts regu-
larly upheld a forum's power over individuals on the basis of presence in
1. 95 U.S. 714 (1878), rev'd, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2. Id. at 720. The term "in personam jurisdiction" refers to the power which a court has over
the defendant himself in contrast to the court's power over the defendant's interest in property
(quasi in rem) or power over the property itself (in rem). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 711 (5th
ed. 1979). A court which lacks personal jurisdiction is without power to issue an in personam
judgment.
3. The term "transient jurisdiction" refers to jurisdiction over persons temporarily present in
the forum. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 410 (3d ed. 1986).
Commentators have variously labeled the concept of transient jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig,
The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE
L.J. 289, 289 (1956) (labeling the concept of transient jurisdiction as the "transient rule"); Posnak,
A Uniform Approach to Judicial Jurisdiction After World-Wide and the Abolition of the "Gotcha"
Theory, 30 EMORY L.J. 729 (1981) (referring to transient jurisdiction as the "Gotcha" theory).
Professor Ehrenzweig has also referred to transient jurisdiction using the "catch-as-catch-can"
terminology. See Ehrenzweig, supra at 306. This author prefers to use the term "transient rule."
4. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722. The Court in Pennoyer based transient jurisdiction on the terri-
torial conception of judicial power that a state has authority over all persons and property within
its borders. See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917). The Pennoyer Court stated this
territorial power theory in the following passage:
The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of
the rights and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the govern-
ment created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instru-
ment, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of
public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is,
that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property
within its territory. As a consequence, every State has the power to determine for itself the
civil status and capacities of its inhabitants.... The other principle of public law referred
to follows from the one mentioned; that is, that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and
authority over persons or property without its territory. The several States are of equal
dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all
others. And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one
State have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and
that no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to
subject either persons or property to its decisions.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
that forum.5 Many commentators, however, consider Pennoyer's applica-
tion to be outdated and inconsistent with later Supreme Court decisions.6
The decision given landmark status with regard to transient jurisdiction
is Shaffer v. Heitner.7 The Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer related only
to quasi in rem and in rem jurisdiction.8 However, many subsequent deci-
95 U.S. at 722 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied by the Court). This "territorial power"
theory led to the Supreme Court decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945), which introduced a "reasonableness test" and "fairness doctrine" as a basis for a "mini-
mum contact" analysis. For a discussion of International Shoe, see infra notes 21-30 and accom-
panying text.
5. See, e.g., Fitzhugh v. Reid, 252 F. 234, 237 (E.D. Ark. 1918) (upholding jurisdiction over
defendant served while in forum for medical treatment); Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442,
447 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (upholding jurisdiction over defendant served while flying over forum);
Nielsen v. Braland, 264 Minn. 481, 484, 119 N.W.2d 737, 739 (1963) (upholding jurisdiction over
defendant served while traveling through forum); see also Lee v. Baird, 139 Ala. 526, 528, 36 So.
720, 720 (1904) (upholding jurisdiction over defendant served while traveling through forum);
Fisher, Brown & Co. v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 104, 34 A. 714, 715 (1895) (upholding jurisdiction
over defendant served while in forum on business unrelated to cause of action).
6. See, e.g., Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of In
Personam Jurisdiction?, 25 VILL. L. REV. 38 (1979); Brilmayer, Haverkamp, Logan, Lynch, Neu-
wirth and O'Brien, A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 723, 749 (1988)
[hereinafter Brilmayer]; Fyr, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Supreme Court's Latest Last Words on State
Court Jurisdiction, 26 EMORY L.J. 739 (1977); Lacy, Personal Jurisdiction and Service of Sum-
mons After Shaffer v. Heitner, 57 OR. L. REv. 505 (1978); Sedler, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice
of Law: The Consequences of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1031 (1978); Silberman, Shaf-
fer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33 (1978); Vernon, Single-Factor Bases of
In Personam Jurisdiction - A Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH.
U.L.Q. 273 (1978); Vernon, State-Court Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Impact of
Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IOWA L. REV. 997 (1978); Werner, Dropping the Other Shoe: Shaffer v.
Heitner and the Demise of Presence-Oriented Jurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 565, 572 (1979);
Zammit, Reflections on Shaffer v. Heitner, 5 HASrINGS CONST. L.Q. 15 (1978); Note, The Physi-
cal Presence Basis of Personal Jurisdiction Ten Years After Shaffer v. Heitner: A Rule in Search of
a Rationale, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 713 (1987); see also 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1064, at 251-53 (2d ed. 1987). But see Abrams, Power, Conven-
ience and the Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 58 IND. L.J. 1, 4 (1982)
(contending that there is no constitutional ban to transient jurisdiction); Glen, An Analysis of
"Mere Presence" and Other Traditional Bases of Jurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 607, 611
(1979) (asserting that transient jurisdiction is appropriate if an individual entered a forum
purposefully).
7. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
8. The term "quasi in rem" jurisdiction refers to the "[t]ype of jurisdiction of a court based on
a person's interest in property within the jurisdiction of the court. There must be a connection
involving minimum contact between the property and the subject matter of the action for a state
to exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1121 (5th ed. 1979) (citing
Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186).
The term "in rem jurisdiction" is "[a] technical term used to designate proceedings or actions
instituted against the thing, in contradistinction to personal actions, which are said to be in per-
sonam." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 713 (emphasis in original).
The Shaffer Court further indicated that there must be a connection involving "minimum
contacts" between the property and the subject matter of the action for a state to exercise quasi in
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sions have relied on Shaffer to determine whether transient jurisdiction can
be exercised simply by serving the defendant in the forum state.9
This Comment will discuss whether the standards applied in Shaffer to
quasi in rem and in rem actions should be extended to personal jurisdiction
based on the concept of transient jurisdiction. Many courts still apply the
"transient rule" 10 while others have specifically overruled it." This Com-
ment will explain why the United States Supreme Court should take a final
step to abolish the "transient rule."
Transient jurisdiction is outdated and should be abolished. The United
States Supreme Court has developed a "minimum contacts" standard that
should be applied to all cases of in personam jurisdiction. 2 Each state has
also developed its own statutes to govern the sufficiency of a defendant's
activities in the forum state. 3 By eliminating the concept of transient juris-
diction and by applying the "minimum contacts" rationale, in personam
jurisdiction will become more "fair" to defendants. It will not inhibit their
right to travel 4 and will relieve many courts from the burdensome task of
examining claims of immunity from transient jurisdiction15 or claims for
dismissal due to venue problems.1 6
rem jurisdiction. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207. For a discussion of Shaffer, see infra notes 40-46 and
accompanying text.
9. See, eg., Telco Leasing, Inc. v. Marshall County Hosp., 586 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1978);
Church of Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1978); Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584 F.2d
833 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Fehr Bros. v. Acciaierie Weissenfels, 439 U.S. 983
(1978); Toro Co. v. Ballas Liquidating Co., 572 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1978); Empire Abrasive
Equip. Corp. v. H.H. Watson, Inc., 567 F.2d 554 (3d Cir. 1977); Bethany Auto Sales, Inc. v.
Aptco Auto Auction, Inc., 564 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1977); Miller Brewing Co. v. Acme Process
Equip. Co., 441 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Pavlo v. James, 437 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Merkel Assoc., Inc. v. Bellowfram Corp., 437 F. Supp. 612 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Braband v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 72 Ill. 2d 548, 382 N.E.2d 252 (1978), cert denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1978); Glading
v. Furman, 282 Md. 200, 383 A.2d 398 (1978); Droukas v. Divers Training Academy, Inc., 375
Mass. 149, 376 N.E.2d 548 (1978); Town of Haverhill v. City Bank & Trust Co., 119 N.H. 409,
402 A.2d 185 (1979); Moon Carrier v. Reliance Ins. Co., 153 N.J. Super. 312, 379 A.2d 517
(1977).
10. See infra notes 69-100 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 102-20 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 181-207, 236-45 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 128-37, 218-24 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 138-69 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 170-80 and accompanying text.
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II. THE "TRANSIENT RULE": ITS HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
During the seventy years between Pennoyer v. Neff'7 and International
Shoe Co. v. Washington,18 physical presence was the basis of jurisdiction.
Generally, service of process within the forum was sufficient to confer in
personam jurisdiction. Before modern transportation, traveling was diffi-
cult and courts were concerned that defendants could evade suit by avoid-
ing forums in which potential plaintiffs resided. Therefore, after Pennoyer,
courts regularly upheld a forum's power over individuals on the basis of the
person's presence in the forum when served with process.' 9 From 1945 to
the present, however, courts have indirectly eroded the "transient rule" due
to the increased mobility of defendants and the harshness of the rule.2"
A. International Shoe and Its Progeny: The Erosion Process
The erosion of the "transient rule" can be illustrated by an examination
of the United States Supreme Court decision in International Shoe and its
progeny.' In International Shoe, the state of Washington attempted to col-
lect unpaid unemployment compensation taxes from a foreign corpora-
tion. 2 Although the corporation had no office in the state, it employed
about a dozen salesmen over a period of several years to solicit orders for
the shoes manufactured by the corporation. It forwarded those orders to
the corporation's main office in St. Louis, Missouri.23
The Washington unemployment compensation statute authorized an
administrative proceeding to collect the unemployment tax from delinquent
employers. It directed that notice of any such assessment be served person-
ally upon the employer, if the employer could be found within the state of
Washington. If not so found, the employer could be served by registered
mail sent to his last known address.24 With regard to the International
17. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
18. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
19. See, e.g., Fitzhugh v. Reid, 252 F. 234, 237 (E.D. Ark. 1918) (upholding jurisdiction over
defendant served while in forum at health spa); Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D.
Ark. 1959) (upholding jurisdiction over defendant served while flying over forum); Lee v. Baird,
139 Ala. 526, 528, 36 So. 720, 720 (1904) (upholding jurisdiction over defendant served while
traveling through forum); Fisher, Brown & Co. v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 104, 34 A. 714, 715
(1895) (upholding jurisdiction over defendant served while in forum on business unrelated to
cause of action).
20. For an example of the harshness of the "transient rule," see infra notes 133-37 and ac-
companying text.
21. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220 (1957). For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
22. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 311-12.
23. Id. at 313-14.
24. Id. at 312.
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Shoe Company, the notice of assessment was served on a salesman em-
ployed by that corporation in Washington and a copy of it was also deliv-
ered by registered mail to the corporation in St. Louis.25 The Court found
that the corporation's contacts with Washington were sufficient to render it
amenable to a Washington court.26
Justice Stone's opinion did not express any doubt that presence re-
mained a sufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, he
offered a "minimum contacts" basis for jurisdiction consistent with due
process.27 The Court stated:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."2
At first glance, it seems apparent that the Court was reinforcing the "tran-
sient rule."29 However, its emphasis on "fair play and substantial justice,"
25. Id.
26. Id. at 314-20. Further, a court always has jurisdiction to determine ajurisdictional issue.
In Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982), the
United States Supreme Court stated that jurisdictional restrictions are a function of due process,
which acts to protect individual liberty. Id. at 702 n.10. Justice White, writing the majority
opinion, explained that the constitutional requirement of personal jurisdiction is a right that pro-
tects the individual. If it were otherwise, he reasoned, a court could not stop a defendant from
waiving or asserting the requirement. Id. at 704.
27. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. The Court gave four factors in its "minimum con-
tacts" analysis: (1) A defendant is subject to jurisdiction in a forum in which he has had continu-
ous and systematic contacts which give rise to the particular litigation involved; (2) The single act
or sporadic acts of the defendant are not sufficient to give jurisdiction over acts unrelated to those
acts; (3) The continuous acts of the defendant may be so substantial to subject the defendant to
jurisdiction on any cause of action; and (4) Sporadic acts, or even a single act of the defendant, are
sufficient to give jurisdiction for claims arising out of that act or acts if they are of a certain nature
or quality. Id. at 317-18. The second factor clearly states that a single act is not sufficient to grant
jurisdiction over claims unrelated to that act. Id.
28. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (emphasis added).
Although the inference is apparent, the statement does not positively assert that there would be
jurisdiction wherever a defendant was present and served.
29. The Court in Shaffer v. Heitner stated that:
[A]lthough the theory that territorial power is both essential to and sufficient for jurisdic-
tion has been undermined, we have never held that the presence of property [or the pres-
ence of and service upon an individual defendant] in a State does not automatically confer
jurisdiction over the owner's interest in that property.
433 U.S. 186, 211 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the impact of Shaffer
v. Heitner on the "transient rule" of personal jurisdiction, see infra notes 40-46 and accompanying
text.
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and its refusal to solely use the traditional physical power concept, indicate
that the Court had begun to erode the "transient rule.",30
Twelve years later in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. ,31 the
Supreme Court again addressed the issue of transient jurisdiction. In Mc-
Gee, the Court acknowledged that California had an interest in providing
its residents with effective means of redress.32 It went on to hold that the
California court's assertion of jurisdiction did not violate due process. 3
Less than one year after McGee, the Court continued to erode the "tran-
sient rule" when it decided Hanson v. Denckla.34 In Hanson, a domiciliary
of Pennsylvania established a trust in Delaware with a Delaware trustee. 35
She later became domiciled in Florida, where she died. 36 In an action re-
garding the trust assets after her death, a Florida court found that service
by mail upon the Delaware trustee was sufficient to grant in personam juris-
diction because "minimum contacts" existed between the State of Florida
and the trustee.37 The United States Supreme Court held that the Florida
court did not have jurisdiction over the trustee.38
30. The Court in International Shoe adopted a "reasonableness test" to decide if it would be
"fair" to subject the defendant to suit in the forum state. 326 U.S. at 316-17.
31. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
32. Id. at 223.
33. Id. at 223-24. One court has suggested that in personam jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant upheld in McGee may no longer be valid under Shaffer. See Smith v. Lloyd's of
London, 568 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1978). The Smith court stated that, as a result of Shaffer, "the
Supreme Court suggested that the liberal construction placed on the words 'traditional notions of
fair play' in a due process context may be evolving into a more conservative one requiring, per-
haps, even more contacts than those present in McGee." Id. at 1118 n.7.
In McGee, the plaintiff filed suit in California to recover on an insurance contract against a
company which never had an office or agent in California. McGee, 355 U.S. at 221-22. Except for
the single policy in question, the company had not conducted any business in California. Id. at
222. The Court, however, found a "substantial connection" between the contract of insurance
and the forum state for the following reasons: 1) the solicitation to reinsure had been mailed to
the insured in California; 2) the contract was delivered there; 3) the premiums were mailed from
that state; and 4) the insured was a resident of California when he died. Id. at 221, 223. The
Court added that the inconvenience to the defendant did not amount to a denial of due process.
Id. at 224.
34. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). The Hanson decision came out only months after McGee.
35. Id. at 238.
36. Id. at 239.
37. Id. at 241-43.
38. Id. at 251-52. The United States Supreme Court distinguished McGee by indicating that:
(I) the trust in Hanson had no relation to the forum state at the time it was executed, which was
not true with regard to the insurance policy in McGee; and (2) the "bits of trust administration"
carried on by the settlor after she became domiciled in Florida did not bear upon the validity of
the trust agreement, whereas in McGee, the insurance policy would not have existed but for the
solicitation to reinsure which the insurance company had sent to the insured in California. Id.
[Vol. 73:181
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The Hanson Court further indicated the importance of the International
Shoe "minimum contacts" analysis by holding that "minimum contacts"
cannot be found to exist unless "there be some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."39 Thus,
the Court undercut the power concept by emphasizing "fairness," which
again questions the validity of the "transient rule."
B. The Shaffer Decision
Despite these erosions of the "transient rule," service of process in the
forum was not seriously questioned as a means of obtaining jurisdiction
until Shaffer v. Heitner.4 The action in Shaffer was brought in a Delaware
state court against a nonresident. Quasi in rem jurisdiction was asserted on
the basis of the sequestration of defendants' shares in a Delaware Corpora-
tion that, by statute, had their situs in Delaware.41 The state courts allowed
the action to proceed over the defendants' motions to quash, but the
Supreme Court reversed on fourteenth amendment due process grounds.42
The Court held that International Shoe and its progeny should extend to in
personam jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants as well as quasi in rem
and in rem jurisdiction.43 Commentators began to interpret Shaffer's exten-
sion of "minimum contacts" to all bases of jurisdiction as an end to the
"transient rule."'  These individuals relied on critical language in Justice
Marshall's opinion which stated that "all assertions of state-court jurisdic-
tion must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International
Shoe and its progeny."45
The Shaffer decision continued to erode the "transient rule" and thus
set the stage for its abolishment. Although the United States Supreme
Court has not specifically overruled the concept of transient jurisdiction,
some post-Shaffer cases indicate that the concept of transient jurisdiction is
39. Id. at 253 (citing International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319 (1945)) (emphasis added).
40. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
41. Id. at 186-87. Quasi in rem jurisdiction has been recognized since Pennoyer as the theory
under which the Court exercises jurisdiction over property within the state and therefore subject
to state power. This procedure indirectly affects the interests of the absent owner.
42. Id. at 213-17.
43. Id. at 212.
44. See, eg., Bernstine, supra note 6, at 61; Brilmayer, supra note 6, at 755; Posnak, supra
note 3, at 744; see also 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 1067, at 251-53. But see Glen,
supra note 6, at 611-12.
45. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
1989]
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outdated.46 One such case is Kulko v. Superior Court of California.47 In a
discussion unnecessary to the central issue, the Court used language which
indicates a further intrusion upon the concept of transient jurisdiction.48
The Court stated that "[t]he existence of personal jurisdiction... depends
upon the presence of reasonable notice to the defendant that an action has
been brought and a sufficient connection between the defendant and forum
State to make it fair to require a defense of the action in the forum."49
C. Post-Shaffer Decisions
Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. ,0 was the first lower court decision to
reject the "transient rule." In Schreiber, a Kansas resident brought an ac-
tion in Mississippi against a Delaware corporation having its principle place
of business in Wisconsin. The suit was based on an action which occurred
in Kansas." The business that the defendant conducted in Mississippi was
unrelated to the source of the plaintiff's claim.s2 Nevertheless, personal
jurisdiction was obtained over the defendant on the theory that the corpora-
tion was "present" in the jurisdiction because it was licensed to do business
in the state.53 The case was then transferred to the district court of Kansas
46. See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 483 (D. Kan. 1978)
(dictum); Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 448 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Kan. 1978) (alternative hold-
ing), rev'd, 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979). For a discussion of Energy Reserves and Schreiber, see
infra notes 50-68 and accompanying text.
47. 436 U.S. 84 (1978). In Kulko, a New York domiciliary challenged the exercise of in
personam jurisdiction by a California forum. The defendant's former wife, a resident of Califor-
nia, brought an action there to establish a Haitian divorce decree as a California judgment and to
modify the judgment. Id. at 87-88. The California Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction based on
the defendant's "purposeful act" of consenting to his daughter's living in California and purchas-
ing a plane ticket to send her there. Id. at 94. The United States Supreme Court reversed and
held that a forum's interest in protecting resident children and facilitating child support actions on
their behalf was insufficient to make California a "'fair forum' in which to require [defendant],
who derives no personal or commercial benefit from his child's presence in California and who
lacks any other relevant contact with the State, either to defend a child support suit or to suffer
liability by default." Id. at 100-01 (citation omitted).
48. Id. at 91.
49. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
50. 448 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Kan. 1978).
51. Id. at 1081. The plaintiff chose to file suit in Mississippi because it had a longer statute of
limitations period than Kansas. Id. The action was filed in Mississippi six days before the six-
year Mississippi statute of limitations would have run. Id. The claim would have been barred by
the Kansas statute of limitations. Id.
52. Id. at 1085. The source of the plaintiff's claim was that the business conducted by Allis-
Chalmers in Mississippi was unrelated to its manufacture of farm machinery. Id.
53. Id. at 1085-86. Irrespective of whether the events occurred in Mississippi, Mississippi law
provides for service upon any corporation found doing business in Mississippi. Id.; see also Miss.
CODE ANN. § 79-1-27, 29 (1972).
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which applied Mississippi law."4 The defendant, however, successfully
challenged the jurisdiction of the Mississippi court.55
The defendant claimed that if Mississippi could not assert personal ju-
risdiction, then the state certainly could not apply its statute of limitations
to the plaintiff's claim. 6 Further, the defendant argued that even if juris-
diction could have been properly assured by Mississippi, that because of its
conflict of laws principles, Mississippi would have applied the shorter Kan-
sas statute of limitations while dismissing the action. 7
The Schreiber court relied on the "minimum contacts" standard of In-
ternational Shoe to find that the corporation was not "present" in the juris-
diction for purposes of service.5 The court stated that "[t]here can be no
question that a 'power' theory of jurisdiction, relying on outmoded notions
of 'presence' or 'consent,' has no place in a discussion of power to effect
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident individual who did not act and
caused no injury within the forum state."'59 The Schreiber court further
explained that:
After Shaffer, plaintiff cannot rely solely on the asserted fact of
'presence' to sustain an exercise of jurisdiction in Mississippi, for
'physical presence is no longer either necessary or sufficient for in
personam actions.' Rather, the nature and quality of that 'presence'
must be evaluated, with an eye toward the interest of Mississippi in
assuming jurisdiction and providing a forum for this particular
action.60
This language indicates that the court might have been willing to find that
transient presence was no longer a sufficient basis for the exercise of in per-
sonam jurisdiction over individuals, even though the case concerned corpo-
54. Schreiber, 448 F. Supp. at 1082. The defendant successfully argued that the transfer must
be done for the convenience of the parties and witnesses. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976).
55. Schreiber, 448 F. Supp. at 1082. The defendant argued that the plaintiff's claim was
barred by the Kansas statute of limitations. Id. The defendant stated that since the Mississippi
court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the Kansas court must apply its own statute
of limitations. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-513, 84-2-725.
58. Schreiber, 448 F. Supp. at 1090-91. The court further declared that Shaffer requires that
"any assumption of jurisdiction must meet the 'contacts' test of International Shoe." Id. at 1089.
59. Id. at 1087 (dictum) (emphasis supplied by the court).
60. Id. at 1089 (quoting Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdiction
Theory?, 26 KAN. L. REV. 61, 77 (1977)) (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied by the court).
1989]
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rate presence.61 However, at least one commentator has suggested that the
Schreiber case should not be extended beyond its facts.62
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co. 63 was the next lower
court decision to show disfavor towards the concept of transient jurisdic-
tion. In Energy Reserves, a cause of action was brought against two corpo-
rations; one doing business in Kansas, the other a Nevada subsidiary which
did not do business in Kansas.' Although the court could have found the
subsidiary amenable65 in Kansas simply because of its transient presence,
the court instead applied the standard of International Shoe to uphold the
assertion of in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident subsidiary.66 The
court used Schreiber as authority for the proposition that transient presence
is no longer a sufficient basis to support the exercise of in personam jurisdic-
tion.6 7 Therefore, the Energy Reserves court stated, that "presence is ...
neither necessary nor always sufficient as a basis to support the exercise of
jurisdiction."68
1. The Blacketer Decision: The "Transient Rule" Affirmed
One of the first post-Shaffer cases to decide whether an individual is still
subject to the "transient rule" was Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer.6 9
In Blacketer, the plaintiff corporation sued to recover the amount of a debt
61. See Bernstine, supra note 6, at 56. Corporations are not necessarily subject to jurisdiction
simply because an agent was sued while in the forum on corporate business. See R. LEFLAR,
AMERICAN CONFLIcTs LAW 50 (3d ed. 1977). Although no explanation for this disparate treat-
ment between corporate and individual defendants is suggested in the case law, "a possible expla-
nation . . . is that generally it is more difficult for the plaintiff to bring an individual into court
than a corporation." Posnak, supra note 3, at 731 n.9. Nevertheless, it seems inconsistent to
subject individual defendants to jurisdiction based on service of process within the forum state
when individual agents of corporations, who are served, are not subjecting their corporations to
such suits.
62. Bernstine, supra note 6, at 56-57. Bernstine based his opinion on three major points: (1)
That the case included corporate rather than individual presence; (2) After holding that the Mis-
sissippi court could not assert jurisdiction over the case without violating due process rights, the
court went on to consider the defendant's alternative conflict of laws argument - an action which
undermines the court's assertion that its jurisdictional holding "commands dismissal of the case in
accordance with [the] defendant's motion;" and (3) The court had a bias against the plaintiff's
attorney. Id.
63. 460 F. Supp. 483 (D. Kan. 1978).
64. Id. at 491.
65. Amenability is a term that can be used interchangeably with in personam jurisdiction
and is defined as "[s]ubject to answer to the law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 74 (5th ed. 1979).
66. Energy Reserves, 460 F. Supp. at 515.
67. Id. at 504; see also Warren v. Honda Motor Co., 669 F. Supp. 363, 369 (D. Utah 1987).
68. Id.




owed to it by an Oklahoma corporation.70 The plaintiff also sued Blacketer,
an officer of the Oklahoma corporation, hoping to recover for the individual
defendant's fraudulent misrepresentation that he was personally liable as a
partner.71 Blacketer, a nonresident of Wisconsin,72 was served while he was
physically present in that state.73 The defendant agent cited International
Shoe as authority for the proposition that an individual must have certain
"minimum contacts" with the forum state to be subject to the jurisdiction
of that state.74 The defendant further alleged that mere physical presence
was no longer sufficient to grant personal jurisdiction.75
The Blacketer court, however, refused to accept the defendant's conten-
tions. The court instead stated that "[p]hysical presence is the traditional
basis of judicial jurisdiction."76 Justice Abrahamson, writing the majority
opinion for the Wisconsin Supreme Court, continued:
In our view the United States Supreme Court has not imposed a
"minimum contacts" requirement on a state's assertion of jurisdic-
tion over a natural person upon whom personal service within the
state has been achieved. Neither International Shoe nor its progeny,
including the recent case of Shaffer v. Heitner ... addresses the issue
of the constitutionality of the state's exercising jurisdiction based
solely on the service of process upon an individual physically present
within state borders.77
In reaching this conclusion, the Blacketer court only relied upon three
sources.7" First, the court cited two pre-Shaffer cases that upheld transient
jurisdiction and rejected any attack on the "transient rule" based on Inter-
national Shoe.79 It then quoted extensively from a comment on Shaffer that
appears in a tentative draft of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. s0
70. Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d at 686, 273 N.W.2d at 286.
71. Id. at 692-93, 273 N.W.2d at 289-90.
72. It is implicit in the opinion that he was not a domiciliary or resident of Wisconsin. Id. at
689-92, 273 N.W.2d at 287-89.
73. Id. at 686, 273 N.W.2d at 286.
74. Id. at 687, 273 N.W.2d at 287 (citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 687, 273 N.W.2d at 286. The Blacketer court looked to subsection 801.05(1)(a) of
the Wisconsin Statutes which provides that a court has jurisdiction over a "defendant who when
the action is commenced is a natural person present within this state when served." Id. The court
went on to indicate that Professor Foster of the University of Wisconsin Law School has charac-
terized transient jurisdiction as "solidly established." Id. at 687.
77. Id. at 687-88, 273 N.W.2d at 287 (footnote omitted).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 687 n.3, 273 N.W.2d at 287 n.3. The Blacketer court cited Donald Manter Co. v.
Davis, 543 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1976) and Nielsen v. Braland, 264 Minn. 481, 119 N.W.2d 737
(1963). Id.
80. See Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d at 688 n.4, 273 N.W.2d at 287 n.4. The court states:
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Nevertheless, the Blacketer court went on to apply the "minimum con-
tacts" test of International Shoe" and concluded that it was "reasonable,
just and consistent with traditional notions of fair play" to subject the indi-
vidual defendant to suit in Wisconsin.82
On its face, it appears the Blacketer decision reinforced the "transient
rule." An argument, however, can be made to the contrary. Justice Abra-
hamson proceeded to fully analyze the defendant's contacts with the state.
The court concluded that the defendant's contacts satisfied both standards.
Thus, the Blacketer court seemed compelled to look for an alternative basis
to find in personam jurisdiction, without relying solely on the defendant's
transient presence.
2. Post-Shaffer Decisions Agreeing With Blacketer
The decision in Blacketer set the stage for a series of other opinions
upholding in personam jurisdiction based on the transient presence of non-
resident defendants in the forum state.83 One such recent holding was ar-
In light of [Shaffer], it may well be doubted whether.., defendant's "presence in the state,
even for an instant, gives the state judicial jurisdiction over him," in the absence of some
connection between the state and the transaction or the parties involved in the litigation.
Shaffer v. Heitner seems to undercut that proposition, but the effect on territorial jurisdic-
tion is modest. Given the doctrine of forum non conveniens, few if any states would exer-
cise jurisdiction in such circumstances. As a theoretical matter, however, the effect of
Shaffer v. Heitner is considerable. It would establish "minimum contacts" in place of pres-
ence as the principle basis for territorial jurisdiction.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 8, comment a, at 63-64 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1978) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28, comment a (1971))). Id.
(citation omitted).
81. Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d at 688, 273 N.W.2d at 287.
82. Id. at 693, 273 N.W.2d at 289. The Blacketer court relied on the facts found by the trial
court to demonstrate the presence of sufficient contacts, which included the following: (1) The
individual defendant started doing business with the plaintiff in order to supply a new restaurant
being opened in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; (2) Forty-four of fifty business meetings between the par-
ties were held in the individual defendant's offices in Milwaukee; and (3) The cause of action arose
out of a meeting held in Milwaukee at which the individual defendant allegedly misrepresented
that he would be personally liable on the debt as a general partner. Id. at 689-90, 273 N.W.2d at
288.
83. Most courts claim that jurisdiction based on physical presence remains alive and well.
See, e.g., Amusement Equip. Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985); Driver v. Helms, 577
F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979); Opert v. Schmid, 535 F. Supp. 591
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Ruggieri v. General Well Serv., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 525, 529 (D. Colo. 1982)
(dictum); O'Brien v. Eubanks, 701 P.2d 614, 616 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 904
(1985); Hutto v. Plagens, 254 Ga. 512, 513, 330 S.E.2d 341, 343 (1985); Gant v. Gant, 254 Ga.
239, 242, 327 S.E.2d 723, 725 (1985); Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 733-34, 273 S.E.2d 22,
23-24 (1980); In re Marriage of Pridemore, 146 Ill. App. 3d 990, 100 11. Dec. 640,497 N.E.2d 818
(1986); Swarts v. Dean, 13 Kan. App. 2d 228, 766 P.2d 1291 (Ct. App. 1989); MacLeod, 383 A.2d
39; Cariaga v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 104 Nev. 82, 762 P.2d 886 (1988); E1-Maksoud v.
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ticulated by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Lockert v. Breedlove.84
In Lockert, a nonresident defendant was served with process while present
in North Carolina. Rejecting the defendant's claim that dismissal for lack
of "minimum contacts" was appropriate, the Lockert court reasoned that
the "minimum contacts" test of due process, as set forth in International
Shoe and later cases, is inapplicable where the defendant is served in the
forum state:
The Pennoyer Court recognized, inter alia, what came to be known
as the transient rule of jurisdiction whereby mere service of process
upon a nonresident present in the forum state was sufficient to estab-
lish personal jurisdiction.... We conclude•., that a close reading
of International Shoe and later cases reveals that the Supreme Court
has not abolished the transient rule of jurisdiction.... [R]ather, it
set out an alternative means of establishing personal jurisdiction
when the defendant is 'not present within the territory of the forum.'
... For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the rule continues to be
that personal service on a nonresident party, at a time when that
party is present in the forum state, suffices in and of itself to confer
personal jurisdiction over that party. 5
Later cases in the North Carolina Court of Appeals used Lockert as their
authority for the same holding. 6
Another recent case, Nutri- West v. Gibson, 7 ruled that the "transient
rule" is alive and well. In Nutri- West, the plaintiff agreed to enter a chiro-
practic machine distributorship with the defendants.88 Three years later,
the plaintiff became unhappy with the defendants' performance and filed an
action for declaratory judgment and an injunction terminating the distribu-
torship agreement.89 When one of the defendants entered Wyoming (the
forum state) to attend a meeting, the plaintiff served her with process. 90
The Nutri- West court relied on Amusement Equipment v. Mordelt,91 and
EI-Maksoud, 237 N.J. Super. 483, 568 A.2d 140 (1989); Morris v. Morris, 371 S.E.2d 756 (N.C.
App. 1988); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 89 N.C. App. 705, 367 S.E.2d 4 (1988); Lockert v. Breedlove, 321
N.C. 66, 361 S.E.2d 581 (1987); Mannio v. Davenport, 99 Wis. 2d 602, 299 N.W.2d 823, 826
(1981) (dictum); Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d at 688, 273 N.W.2d at 287 (1979) (dictum); Nutri-West v.
Gibson, 764 P.2d 693 (Wyo. 1988). For a discussion of Lockert and Nutri-West, see infra notes
84-96 and accompanying text. For a discussion of El-Maksoud, see infra notes 98-100 and accom-
panying text.
84. 321 N.C. 66, 361 S.E.2d 581 (1987).
85. Id. at 69-72, 361 S.E.2d at 583-85 (citation omitted).
86. See Morris, 371 S.E.2d at 758; Jenkins, 89 N.C. App. at 707, 367 S.E.2d at 5.
87. 764 P.2d 693 (Wyo. 1988).
88. Id. at 694.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 779 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985).
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indicated that personal service upon a nonresident defendant in the forum
state is sufficient to subject the defendant to in personam jurisdiction.92 The
court stated that "[j]urisdiction based upon personal service within the fo-
rum state is a concept that is historically entrenched, universally recog-
nized, very predictable, and easy to apply. One cannot claim unfair surprise
when he enters a state and is subjected to the jurisdiction of that state's
courts."
' 9 3
Although the court indicated that the "minimum contacts" analysis
from International Shoe was inapplicable, Chief Justice Cardine nonetheless
stated that the exercise of in personam jurisdiction must also satisfy due
process.94 Even though Justice Cardine detected no unfairness or injustice
in the exercise of personal jurisdiction based upon an individual's presence
within a state,95 he did indicate that "we are unwilling to reject this estab-
lished jurisdictional principle without direction from a higher authority."96
Thus, the court may have welcomed some authority to the contrary.
Recent decisions in other jurisdictions have agreed with Nutri- West.97
In El-Maksoud v. El-Maksoud,98 the Superior Court of New Jersey indi-
cated that Nutri- West was correct in its analysis. The court indicated that
"it is constitutionally permissive to predicate personal jurisdiction on tem-
porary physical presence and personal service within the forum state." 99
Agreeing with Nutri- West that the "transient rule" should not be rejected
"without direction from a higher authority," the court went on to indicate
that "[a]ny unfairness to the defendant can be addressed by application of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens."1°  Nevertheless, this author will
indicate that the doctrine of forum non conveniens has severe limitations. 101
3. Post-Shaffer Decisions Refusing to Follow the "Transient Rule"
Since the decision in Blacketer, some courts have held that in personam
jurisdiction based solely upon the transient presence of the defendant in the
92. Nutri-West, 764 P.2d at 695-96.
93. Id. at 696.
94. Id. at 695.
95. Id. at 696.
96. Id. (citing Opert, 535 F. Supp. at 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)) (emphasis added).
97. See, e.g., Swarts, 13 Kan. App. 2d 228, 766 P.2d 1291 (Ct. App. 1989); Cariaga, 104 Nev.
82, 762 P.2d 886; El-Maksoud, 237 N.J. Super. 483, 568 A.2d 140..
98. 237 N.J. Super. 483, 568 A.2d 140 (1989).
99. Id. at 488-89, 568 A.2d at 143 (quoting Nutri- West, 764 P.2d at 694).
100. Id. at 490, 568 A.2d at 144.
101. See infra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
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forum state is invalid.1 °2 A United States District Court, in Harold M. Pit-
man Co. v. Typecraft Software Ltd.,"°3 held that the mere service of process
upon a defendant, in accordance with Shaffer, does not vest a state with
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. In Pitman, the officer, director
and ninety percent shareholder of Typecraft Software was served with a
summons and complaint while in the forum state for the first time on a
three-day business trip. 'I The court indicated that personal service within
the jurisdiction was not the proper test for in personam jurisdiction. 105
Rather, the court stated that the proper test was whether the defendant had
"minimum contacts" with the forum so as to make it reasonable for the
defendant to be subject to suit in the forum state. 106
In Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress of the USA., 107 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also held that a court could not
obtain jurisdiction over an unincorporated association merely by service
upon an agent transiently present within the state. 10 The Nehemiah court,
relying on Shaffer, extended the application of the International Shoe "min-
imum contacts" requirement to unincorporated associations.10 9
Another recent pronouncement concerning the concept of transient ju-
risdiction was made by an Ohio appeals court. In Lonigro v. Lonigro,110
Justice Wolff indicated that the "time is ripe to consider whether the stan-
dard of fairness and substantial justice set forth in International Shoe
should be held to govern actions in rem as well as in personam." 1  Lonigro
involved a couple who were married for fourteen years and had four chil-
dren while living in Richmond, Indiana." 2 When the couple finally sepa-
rated in 1986, Lena Lonigro left Indiana and moved to Kettering, Ohio
102. See, e.g., Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress of the U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42, 46 (3d Cir. 1985);
Waffenschmidt v. Mackay, 763 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1985), cerL denied, sub. nom. Waffenschmidt v.
First Nat'l Bank of Mount Vernon, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986); Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft
Software, Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Il. 1986); Mohler v. Dorado Wings, Inc., 675 S.W.2d 404
(Ky. Ct. App. 1984); Lonigro v. Lonigro, No. 10780 (Ohio App. July 26, 1988) (LEXIS, States
Library, Ohio File); Bershaw v. Sarbacher, 40 Wash. App. 653, 700 P.2d 347 (1985).
103. 626 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. I1. 1986).
104. Id. at 307.
105. Id. at 312.
106. Id. For a discussion of the "reasonableness test" with regard to "minimum contacts" as
developed by the United States Supreme Court in International Shoe, see supra notes 21-30 and
accompanying text.
107. 765 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1985).
108. Id. at 47.
109. Id.
110. No. 10780 (Ohio App. July 26, 1988) (LEXIS, States Library, Ohio File).
111. Id. at 8.
112. Id. at 1-2.
1989]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
with her minor child, Monica. 13 Aldo Lonigro never lived in Ohio, but did
visit Lena on at least ten occasions. Approximately one year after their
separation, Lena filed her complaint for divorce. 14 Aldo was personally
served with the complaint at or near Lena's Kettering residence.' 15
The trial court ruled that personal service was not sufficient to confer
jurisdiction." 6 Justice Wolff, writing the opinion for the court of appeals,
stated "[w]e agree with the trial court that Due Process requires an analysis
of minimum contacts under International Shoe . . . and its progeny."'"17
The Justice went on to cite Shaffer with approval: " 'It is clear.., that the
law of state-court jurisdiction no longer stands securely on the foundation
established in Pennoyer.'... We agree with the Pitman court's analysis, and
conclude that transient presence is no longer a viable basis for the assertion
of personal jurisdiction.""' 8 The court used a public policy argument to
support its holding. It relied on Shaffer and the legal principle that a court
may not sequester a defendant's property and assert in rem or quasi in rem
jurisdiction unless there are "minimum contacts" between the defendant,
the litigation and the forum." 9 The court indicated that Shaffer was not
meant to result in the illogical and unfair result of affording less protection
to an individual defendant than to his or her property within the state. 120
III. THE "TRANSIENT RULE": ITS IMPACT ON SOCIETY
The "transient rule" has been viewed as a straightforward, simple and
welcome characteristic in due process litigation.12 1 Upholding transient
presence allows a state court to ignore the complicated balancing required
by the International Shoe "minimum contacts" test.' 22 The rule, however,
has also been characterized as overly broad. 123 It is therefore important for
courts to choose between a clear, simple, yet overly broad rule, or use a rule
that may be a violation of a defendant's due process rights. Some commen-
tators have stated that they believe the concept of transient jurisdiction
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 6.
118. Id. at 8, 12 (citing Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 206).
119. Id. at 7-12.
120. Id. at 10-11.
121. See Brilmayer, supra note 6, at 755.
122. Id. For a discussion of the "minimum contacts" test from International Shoe, see supra
notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. § 801.05(1) (1987-88):
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should be abolished.124 This author adheres to that view and finds support
for it when looking at the "transient rule's" impact on defendants' rights to
travel,125 defendants' immunity from service, 12 6 and venue problems.127
A. The Right to Travel
The "transient rule" has indirectly affected an individual's right to inter-
state travel. Attorneys who believe that their clients do not have "mini-
mum contacts" with the forum state, should prudently advise them not to
enter that state if they wish to avoid being subject to the state's jurisdiction
through service of process. There is, however, a right to interstate travel
grounded in the United States Constitution.
In Shapiro v. Thompson, 2 ' the United States Supreme Court indicated
that "all citizens [should] be free to travel throughout the length and
breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which un-
reasonably burden or restrict this movement."1 29 The United States
Supreme Court has consistently indicated that the right to travel is a basic
right under the Constitution. 1 0 In United States v. Guest,13 1 Justice Stew-
art articulated the fundamental nature of this right, stating:
The constitutional right to travel from one state to another... occu-
pies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It
is a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly recog-
nized .... The reason [the right] has been suggested, is that a right
so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary
concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In any
event, freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been
recognized as a basic right under the Constitution. 132
(1) LOCAL PRESENCE OR STATUS. In any action whether arising within or without this
state, against a defendant who when the action is commenced:
(a) Is a natural person present within this state when served; or
(b) Is a natural person domiciled within this state; or
(c) Is a domestic corporation; or
(d) Is engaged in substantial and not isolated activities within this state, whether such
activities are wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise.
Id. (emphasis added).
124. See, e.g., Bernstine, supra note 6, at 61; Brilmayer, supra note 6, at 752-55; Posnak,
supra note 3, at 731-32.
125. See infra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 138-69 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 170-80 and accompanying text.
128. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
129. Id. at 629. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the court.
130. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 752-58 (1966).
131. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
132. Id. at 757-58 (citation omitted).
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The "transient rule" has unreasonably restricted this constitutional right to
interstate travel.
For example, in Grace v. MacArthur,'33 service of process in an airplane
flying over the forum state was the stated basis of asserting in personam
jurisdiction over one of the defendants.1 34 In Grace, citizens of Arkansas
brought an action against a corporation, a citizen of Illinois, and a citizen of
Tennessee, based on a contract made and executed in Illinois.'35 The Illi-
nois resident was served in an airplane when the plane passed over Arkan-
sas enroute from Memphis, Tennessee to Dallas, Texas. 136 The court held
that such service constituted service within the territorial limits of Arkan-
sas, and declined to grant the Illinois citizen's motion to quash service on
the ground that he was never within the forum state. 137 Grace is precisely
the type of situation that unreasonably restrains interstate travel. With the
rapid increase in technology and the integral role air travel plays in contem-
porary society, more people fly each day with the fear of being served over
the forum state.
B. Immunity From Service
The "transient rule" has been considered by many as a simple and
straightforward rule that is favored by the litigation process. 138 Immunity
from service when the defendant is in the state pursuant to process or sub-
poena served in other non-related litigation has, however, compelled the
courts to decide many issues created by the application of the "transient
rule." 1
39
1. Immunity for Trial-Related Purposes
It has long been recognized that immunity from service of process
should be granted to the defendant when the defendant is a party, witness,
or attorney entering the state from another jurisdiction in order to attend
court or to represent a party in connection with another lawsuit.140 Courts
have generally recognized that immunity should not be granted for the con-
venience of the person seeking it, but instead, should be conferred for the
133. 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
134. Id. at 443.
135. Id. at 443, 447.
136. Id. at 443.
137. Id. at 447-48.
138. See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 6, at 754-55.
139. The concept of immunity from service has become very amorphous and the grant of
immunity varies from state to state. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, §§ 1076-81.
140. Id. at § 1076.
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convenience of the court and made available only to further the administra-
tion of justice.141
Defendants who are parties to another lawsuit have generally been im-
mune from service of process when present in the forum state. In United
States v. Krasnov,142 a federal district court held that the defendants were
immune from service of process while present in the state as a party to
another lawsuit.143 The court stated that nonresident parties are generally
exempt from service of process while in attendance at, traveling to, or re-
turning from court. 1" In a more recent case, Uniroyal, Inc. v. Sperberg,145
the court implied that a party who is in a jurisdiction for the purpose of
answering interrogatories at his attorney's office is immune from service if
his activities in the jurisdiction are so confined. 1"
The "transient rule" has also created a need for immunity when defend-
ants enter the forum state as a witness in another trial.147 In Rimar v. Mc-
Cowan,"' another federal district court concluded that a witness who was
the defendant in a separate case was immune from service while in the juris-
diction for purposes of attending an unrelated court proceeding.1 49 The
court held no merit in the argument that an FBI agent, in the unrelated
action when he was served, should be treated differently. 150 Although un-
successful, the action in Rimar is only one example of the impact that the
"transient rule" has on witnesses entering the forum state. Many other cir-
141. This rationale was articulated in Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128 (1916), where the
Court stated that "[ilt is founded in the necessities of the judicial administration, which would be
often emphasized and sometimes interrupted, if the suitor might be vexed with process while
attending upon the court for the protection of his rights, or the witness while attending to testify."
Id. at 130.
142. 109 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
143. Id. at 148.
144. Id. at 147.
145. 63 F.R.D. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). in Uniroyal, a party was served in New York while he
was in that state for both business and social activities which were unrelated to his dealings with
Uniroyal. Id. at 58. The court indicated that Sperberg could have consulted with his attorney
with regard to the answering of interrogatories in any other state but instead chose New York. Id.
The United States District Court therefore, held that since Sperberg did not confine his activities
in New York to just the answering of interrogatories in his attorney's office, he was not immune
from service of process. Id.
146. Id. at 58-9.
147. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 1076.
148. 374 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
149. Id. at 1183.
150. Id. at 1182.
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cumstances have evolved which have forced the courts to decide witness
immunity issues.1 51
2. Immunity in Non-Trial Situations
The impact of the "transient rule" has also compelled judges to rule on
immunity of service of process in non-trial situations. A person who is in a
jurisdiction in order to give a deposition may claim immunity on the same
basis as one who is there to attend a trial.'5 2 At least one court has further
held that a defendant who enters a jurisdiction for settlement talks may not
be served unless warned in advance by the plaintiff of the possibility of ser-
vice of process.1 53
Courts have also been forced to apply immunity standards to cover
those who are in the jurisdiction to appear at an administrative hearing or
before a legislative committee. 154 Other immunity issues have compelled
courts to make decisions with regard to the constitutional privilege granted
151. See, eg., Moylan v. AMF Overseas Corp., 354 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1965) (nonresident
defendant testifying in an action on behalf of his employer was exempt from service); Walker v.
Calada Materials Co., 309 F.2d 74 (10th Cir. 1962) (nonresident officer of a corporation was not
subject to jurisdiction when attending the trial of another case); Kollenborn v. Murphy, 118 F.
Supp. 848 (N.D. Tex. 1954) (witnesses who entered jurisdiction to give testimony in divorce pro-
ceedings were not amenable to service of process when waiting to testify outside of the court-
room); Morse-Koob, Inc. v. Milner Export & Trading Co., 93 F. Supp. 344 (W.D. Okla. 1950)
(corporation president attending a reorganization proceeding as a witness was immune from ser-
vice of process on the corporation in another action).
152. See, e.g., Beeber v. LaFrance, 360 F. Supp. 1030, 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (Massachusetts
residents were immune from service of process while in New York for the taking of a deposition);
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. American Chem. Paint Co., 67 F. Supp. 685 (D. Del. 1946) (nonresident
defendant was immune while in the forum state taking a deposition in another case).
153. K Mart Corp. v. Gen-Star Indus. Co., 110 F.R.D. 310 (E.D. Mich. 1986). The court in
K Mart stated that service of process on a defendant not normally present in the jurisdiction who
has entered for settlement talks is prohibited unless:
[T]he plaintiff warns the defendant before he enters the jurisdiction that he may subject
himself to process, or else when settlement talks fail the plaintiff must give the defendant
an opportunity to leave the jurisdiction before service is made. Such a rule avoids inherently
difficult determinations as to who initiated meetings, who relied on statements made by
whom, and whether the plaintiff engaged in good faith settlement. Such a bright-line rule
promotes good faith settlement, is efficient from a judicial standpoint, and serves to dis-
tance the courts from the possibility of trickery.
Id. at 313 (emphasis in original).
154. See, e.g., Pavlo v. James, 437 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (nonresident defendant in
forum state as a witness in a arbitration proceeding); Youpe v. Strasser, 113 F. Supp. 289 (D.C.
1953) (holding that immunity of nonresident witnesses from service of process applies to witnesses
before bodies of legislative branch of government); Sullivan v. Kilgore Mfg., 100 F. Supp. 983
(E.D.N.Y. 1951) (indicating that defendant was immune from service when in forum state to
attend hearings conducted by the United States Coast Guard); Stratton v. Hughes, 211 F. 557
(D.N.J. 1914) (nonresident in forum state for a proceeding before the motor vehicle commission).
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to senators and representatives from arrest,' 5 government employee immu-
nity while on official business,15 6 and diplomatic immunity.157
3. Immunity for Enticement into the Jurisdiction
Courts have generally ruled that in personam jurisdiction cannot be ob-
tained over an otherwise non-amenable defendant through the "transient
rule" when the individual was in some manner enticed 58 into entering the
jurisdiction. The immunity is granted to a party who is induced to come
into the jurisdiction either by the plaintiff, or the plaintiff's attorney. 5 9 As
early as 1917, the courts of the United States began eroding the "transient
rule's" harsh impact through standards of immunity from entitlement.16
In Blandin v. Ostrander,161 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals indi-
cated that jurisdiction over the defendant based on transient presence can-
not occur if the defendant was fraudulently induced by the plaintiff, or
plaintiff's attorney, into entering the forum state.1 62 The court stated that:
[a] party found within the jurisdiction may, of course, be there
served; "but it cannot be said that he was so found there, if he was
... enticed into the district for the purpose of making... service
upon him, by false representations and deceitful contrivances of the
plaintiff in the suit, or by anyone acting in his behalf.' 63
Many post-Blandin decisions have also offered this protection to defend-
ants who have been tricked into entering the forum state. One such deci-
sion was Wyman v. Newhouse,I" where the plaintiff fraudulently induced
the defendant into entering the forum state by phoning and sending tele-
grams which stated the plaintiff's desperate need to see the defendant.' 6
155. U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 6. This privilege has been interpreted as not applying to service of
civil process. See Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76 (1934).
156. See United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482 (1868), where the Court said that governmental
employees and agents are not immune from service of process, although they may be immune
from arrest on civil process while on official business. Id. at 486.
157. Diplomatic immunity extends to all process including ordinary civil process. See Hel-
lenic Lines, Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
158. The term "entice" means to attract by arousing hope or desire; lure. AMERICAN HERI-
TAGE DICTIONARY 456 (2d ed. 1982). For purposes of this Comment it also includes trickery,
coercion, intimidation, and inducement.
159. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 1076, at 502-04 n. 11.
160. See Blandin v. Ostrander, 239 F. 700 (2d Cir. 1917).
161. 239 F. 700 (2d Cir. 1917).
162. Id. at 703.
163. Id. at 702.
164. 93 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1937), cert denied, 303 U.S. 664 (1938).
165. Id. at 314. In Wyman, the defendant was a resident of New York and never lived in
Florida. Id. While in Salt Lake City, Utah, he received a telegram from the plaintiff which read:
"Account illness home planning leaving. Please come on way back. Must see you." Id. The
1989]
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The Second Circuit held that a "fraud affecting the jurisdiction is equivalent
to a lack of jurisdiction." '66 Other cases have since applied the same
holding.167
In Jacobs/Kahan & Co. v. Marsh,16 the Seventh Circuit indicated that
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant may not be premised on his physi-
cal presence when that presence was obtained by plaintiff's trickery or
designed solely to create a jurisdictional predicate.1 69 Many courts have
thus tried to soften the harshness of the "transient rule" by granting immu-
nity to defendant's who were fraudulently induced into the forum state by
plaintiffs.
C. Impact of Forum Non Conveniens on Transient Jurisdiction
The "transient rule" has also compelled many courts to interpret and
apply the common law development of forum non conveniens.1 70 The doc-
trine of forum non conveniens is patterned after the right of a court, in the
exercise of its powers, to refuse the imposition upon its jurisdiction the trial
defendant further received another letter stating that the plaintiff had to see him one more time.
This letter was followed by a telephone call from the plaintiff who repeated, in a hysterical and
distressed voice, the substance of her letter. The defendant then flew to Florida because of the
plaintiff's comments and was served with process while present in the state. Id. The Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the defendant was fraudulently induced into
entering Florida and was immune from service. Id. at 315.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Wilson, 254 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1958) (plaintiffs enticed garageman
to bring car to their home); Century Brick Corp. v. Bennett, 235 F. Supp. 455 (W.D. Pa. 1964)
(service held invalid when defendant was enticed into the state on the belief that he would be given
new job assignments); Oliver v. Cruson, 153 F. Supp. 74 (D. Mont. 1957) (service was held to be
invalid when the defendant was fraudulently lured into the jurisdiction for a settlement confer-
ence); Coyne v. Grupo Industrial Trieme, 105 F.R.D. 627 (D.D.C. 1985) (plaintiff fraudulently
induced nonresident defendant to enter the forum state by asking for defendant to appear because
of settlement negotiation); E/M Lubricants, Inc. v. Microfral, S.A.R.L. 91 F.R.D. 235 (D.C. Ill.
198 1) (plaintiff fraudulently failed to notify defendant that he had decided that prelawsuit negotia-
tion was no longer feasible); Sunshine Kitchens, Inc. v. Alanthus Corp., 65 F.R.D. 4 (S.D. Fla.
1974) (plaintiff only wanted to serve process on defendant rather than conduct negotiation in good
faith); Willametz v. Susi, 54 F.R.D. 463 (D. Mass. 1972) (false representation by another made on
plaintiff's behalf for purposes of enticing defendant into the jurisdiction resulted in an abuse of
process).
168. 740 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1984).
169. Id. at 592 n.7.
170. The term "forum non conveniens" refers to the discretionary power of a court to decline
jurisdiction when the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice would be better served if
action were brought and tried in another forum. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 589 (5th ed. 1979)
(citing Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 577, 555 P.2d 997, 999, 1000 (1976)); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1404.
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of cases even though the venue 171 is properly established. Forum non con-
veniens is proper if it appears that, for the convenience of the litigants, the
witnesses, and in the interest of justice, the action should be instituted in
another forum where the action might have been brought.172 The applica-
tion of the doctrine rests on the sound discretion of the court. The factors a
court must consider include the private interests of the litigants, and the
interest of the public.17 3 Some commentators have argued that the harsh-
ness of the "transient rule" on a defendant may be mitigated by the doctrine
of forum non conveniens. 174 Another has indicated that the doctrine does
little to mitigate the harshness of the "transient rule."' 1 75
Nevertheless, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is discretionary, and
rarely will a trial court be overruled for failure to grant the defendant's
motion for dismissal based on forum non conveniens. 176 The doctrine also
171. The term "venue" refers to the "particular county, or geographical area, in which a
court with jurisdiction may hear and determine a case. Venue deals with locality of suit, that is,
with question of which court, or courts, of those that possess adequate personal and subject matter
jurisdiction may hear the specific suit in question." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (5th ed.
1979).
172. Hayes v. Chicago, 79 F. Supp. 821, 824 (D. Minn. 1948). The doctrine also "presup-
poses at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process and furnishes criteria for
choice between them." Wilson v. Seas Shipping Co., 78 F. Supp. 464, 465 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (citing
with approval Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506 (1947)); Neal v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
77 F. Supp. 423, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
173. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). As the GulfOil Court stated:
An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the private interest of
the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining
attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropri-
ate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expedi-
tious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforcibility [sic] of a
judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair
trial. It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, "vex,"
"harrass," or "oppress" the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not neces-
sary to his own right to pursue his remedy.
Id. at 508; see also Di Lella v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 7 F.R.D. 192, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
174. See Bernstine, supra note 6, at 66; Posnak, supra note 3, at 759; see also F. JAMES & G.
HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.13 at 628 n.7 (2d ed. 1970). See generally Barrett, The Doc-
trine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 380 (1947); Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929).
175. See Brilmayer, supra note 6, at 754. For an examination of the reasons why the doctrine
does not mitigate the harshness of the "transient rule," see infra notes 225-35 and accompanying
text.
176. This is due in part to the large number of relevant factors (some of which may conflict),
and the highly subjective nature of assigning weight to those factors. In addition, in those juris-
dictions that adhere to the final decision rule, the issue may not be appealable until there has been
a final decision on the merits. When this is the case, the appellate court may be reluctant to
reverse on the grounds of forum non conveniens because reversal would necessitate a new trial; see
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has severe limitations. It fails to ensure that a defendant will not have to
defend wherever he is served regardless of the overall lack of connection
with the forum. 177 Since the original forum is presumed to be conve-
nient, 178 the burden is on the defendant to show that there is a more conve-
nient forum available. In some states the doctrine has been rejected. 179 In
at least one state the doctrine will not be applied if the plaintiff is a forum
resident.' Regardless of its applicability as a safety valve, the doctrine of
forum non conveniens has compelled courts to rule on such motions be-
cause of the harshness of the "transient rule."
IV. LONG-ARM STATUTES: HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
A. Long-Arm Statutes in General
The broadly written decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington 1
led to the effort of many state legislatures to conform their statutory pattern
to be consistent with the Constitution.'82 This type of legislation, called
"long-arm" statutes, predicated jurisdiction over nonresidents. Such stat-
utes indicate that personal jurisdiction is obtained over a nonresident if the
individual commits any one of a series of enumerated acts within the juris-
diction, or commits a certain act outside the jurisdiction that has conse-
quences within it. A nonresident corporation is amenable upon the doing of
business in the forum state.18 3 In general, jurisdiction based upon the activ-
ities described in these statutes is supported directly or inferentially by cases
decided after International Shoe.1
8 4
In the majority of long-arm statutes, there are vestiges of the "presence"
theory and the "power principle" of transient jurisdiction as expressed in
Pennoyer.18 5 State long-arm statutes, in essence, provide a litigation forum
GulfOil, 330 U.S. at 512. The trial court had granted the motion and dismissed the suit. The
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, not the trial court. Id.
177. See Posnak, supra note 3, at 759.
178. GulfOil, 330 U.S. at 508.
179. See Comment, Forum Non Conveniens, Injunctions Against Suit and Full Faith and
Credit, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 740, 750 (1962).
180. Thomson v. Continental Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 738, 427 P.2d 765, 59 Cal. Rptr. 101
(1967).
181. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). For a discussion of International Shoe see supra notes 21-30 and
accompanying text.
182. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 1068, at 334.
183. The "doing business" test is a predicate for a state's exercise of in personam jurisdiction
over foreign corporations with respect to causes of action not related to the corporation's activities
within the forum state. See Werner, supra note 6, at 575.
184. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 1068, at 335.




for the convenience of a given state's own citizens at the expense of citizens
of other states. Most commentators, however, have agreed that the statu-
tory trend is a proper one due to today's mobile and highly technological
society, which has effectively reduced the time and rigors of travel. I86
Thus, long-arm statutes are just one safety device through which the "tran-
sient rule" can be essentially eliminated."i 7
B. The History of Long-Arm Statutes
The first comprehensive long-arm statute was enacted in Illinois. 88 The
statute has since been used as a model by a number of states.18 9 It was
designed to assert jurisdiction based on permissible constitutional limits.190
Under the Illinois statute, a corporation or an individual is said to be sub-
186. See generally Casad, Long Arm and Convenient Forum, 20 KAN. L. REV. 1 (1971);
Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U.
ILL. L.F. 533; Foster, Judicial Economy; Fairness and Convenience in Place of Trial Long-Arm
Jurisdiction in District Courts, 47 F.R.D. 73 (1968); Rohr, Personal Jurisdiction in Florida; Some
Problems and Proposals, 3 NOVA L.. 365 (1981); Trautman, Long-Arm and Quasi In Rem Juris-
diction in Washington, 51 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1975); Comment, Developments in the Law - State
Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909, 1002-06, 1015-17 (1960); Note, A Reconsideration of
"Long-Arm" Jurisdiction, 37 IND. L.J. 333 (1962); Comment, Limited Jurisdiction in California:
The Long-Arm of the Law Reaches Farther in Tort Than in Contract, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
919 (1977); Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of
Fairness, 69 MICH. L. REv. 300 (1970); Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident
Manufacturers in Product Liability Actions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1028 (1965); see also Smithers,
Virginia' "'Long-Arm "Statute: An Argument for Constitutionality of Jurisdiction over Nonresident
Individuals, 51 VA. L. REV. 712 (1965); Comment, The Long Arm Shrinks: The Supreme Court
and the Problem of the Nonresident Defendant in World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 58
DEN. L.J. 667 (1981).
187. For further discussion of long-arm statutes and their effect on the "transient rule," see
infra notes 236-45 and accompanying text.
188. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 2-209 (1983). The statute reads in part as follows:
§ 2-209. Act submitting to jurisdiction - Process. (a) Any person, whether or not a citi-
zen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts
hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such person, and, if an individual, his or her per-
sonal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action
arising from the doing of any such acts:
(1) The transaction of any business within this State;
(2) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
(3) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this State;
(4) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this State at the
time of contracting;
(5) With respect to actions of dissolution of marriage and legal separation, the mainte-
nance in this State of a matrimonial domicile at the time this cause of action arose
or the commission in this State of any act giving rise to the cause of action.
189. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 634-35 (1985); IDAHO CODE, § 5-514 (1979 Supp.);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.28.185 (1988).
190. See Nelson v. Miller, 1 111. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
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ject to in personam jurisdiction of the Illinois courts, whether a citizen or
noncitizen of Illinois, if he transacts any business within the state, commits
a tort within the state, or contracts to insure any person or property located
within the state.'91 Wisconsin has also enacted such a comprehensive stat-
ute.192 In some ways, it has gone further than Illinois in authorizing its
courts to assert personal jurisdiction over nonresidents.1 93 Several years af-
ter their enactment, both the Illinois and Wisconsin statutes were amended
to include jurisdiction over claims involving alimony, support, and property
191. See supra note 183.
192. Wis. STAT. § 801.05 (1987-88). Subsections (2) through (5) of the statute read as
follows:
(2) SPECIAL JURISDICTION STATUTES. In any action which may be brought under stat-
utes of this state that specifically confer grounds for personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.
(3) LOCAL ACT OR OMISSION. In any action claiming injury to person or property within
or without this state arising out of an act or omission within this state by the
defendant.
(4) LOCAL INJURY; FOREIGN ACT. In any action claiming injury to person or property
within this state arising out of an act or omission outside this state by the defendant,
provided in addition that at the time of the injury, either:
(a) Solicitation or service activities were carried on or within this state by or on behalf
of the defendant; or
(b) Products, materials or things processed, serviced or manufactured by the defendant
were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of trade.
(5) LOCAL SERVICES, GOODS OR CONTRACTS. In any action which;
(a) Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some 3rd [sic]
party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to perform services within this
state or to pay for services to be performed in this state by the plaintiff; or
(b) Arises out of services actually performed for the plaintiff by the defendant
within this state, or services actually performed for the defendant by the plain-
tiff within this state if such performance within this state was authorized or
ratified by the defendant; or
(c) Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some 3rd [sic]
party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to deliver or receive within
this state or to ship from this state goods, documents of title, or other things of
value; or
(d) Relates to goods, documents of title, or other things of value shipped from this
state by the plaintiff to the defendant on the defendant's order or direction; or
(e) Relates to goods, documents of title, or other things of value actually received
by the plaintiff in this state from the defendant without regard to where deliv-
ery to carrier occurred.
193. Id. The Wisconsin statute is coupled with a provision allowing a Wisconsin action to be
stayed in favor of suit in another forum when that seems desirable. The development and purpose
of the Wisconsin long-arm statutes are described in Foster, Judicial Economy; Fairness and Con-
venience of Place of Trial Long-Arm Jurisdiction in District Courts, 47 F.R.D. 73 (1969).
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division against former residents.194 Other states have enacted similar
statutes. 195
Some state long-arm statutes are more limited in application, requiring
the doing of business 196 or an act or omission within the state.197 Although
judicial construction of most long-arm statutes differs, the texts are ex-
tremely similar in order to bring a given statute within the limits of consti-
tutional due process.
C. Nonresident Motorist Statutes
The Supreme Court's decision in Hess v. Pawloski,198 upholding the va-
lidity of a nonresident motorist statute,199 encouraged states to utilize their
police powers to enact a number of statutes asserting jurisdiction based, not
only on the operation of automobiles within a state, but also on engaging in
a variety of other hazardous activities or enterprises. Nonresident motorist
statutes were drafted and applied to cover an even wider range of situations.
They have been broadly interpreted to apply to situations where neither the
plaintiff nor the defendant is a resident of the state in which the accident
occurred.2 "° They also apply to actions against the representative of a de-
194. ILL. ANN. STAT. C.l10, I 2-209(a)(5) (Smith Hurd 1983); Wis. STAT. § 801.05(11)
(1987-88).
195. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.701-.35 (1981). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145
(1982) (foreign corporations doing business in the State); Note, Nonresident Jurisdiction and the
New England Experience, 48 B.U.L. REv. 372 (1968).
Rhode Island enacted a long-arm statute broadly providing that "the courts of this state shall
hold such foreign corporations and such nonresident individuals or their executors or administra-
tors, and such partnerships or associations [that have the necessary minimum contacts with the
state] amenable to suit in Rhode Island in every case not contrary to the provisions of the consti-
tution or laws of the United States." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33 (Supp. 1989). Tennessee has
patterned its long-arm statute after Rhode Island. See TENN. CODE ANN., § 20-2-214 (Supp.
1989).
196. See McShan v. Omega Louis Brandt et Frere, S.A., 536 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1976); Colum-
bia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Schneider, 435 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1288 (2d
Cir. 1978); Development Direction, Inc. v. Zachary, 430 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Fowler
Prods. Co. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Tulsa, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 1339 (M.D. Ga. 1976); Federal
Ins. Co. v. Michigan Wheel Co., 267 F. Supp. 639 (S.D. Fla. 1967); Cf. Florida Towing Corp. v.
Oliver J. Olson & Co., 426 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1970).
197. Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969). The interpre-
tation of statutes phrased in terms of acts or omissions within the state is particularly difficult in
products liability cases in which an attempt is made to secure jurisdiction over a defendant who
has manufactured or produced a product outside the state that causes injury after it is shipped
into the state. Id. at 234-36.
198. 274 U.S. 352 (1927), overruled 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
199. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 345.09 (Supp. 1977).
200. Dart Transit Co. v. Wiggings, 1 Ill. App. 2d 126, 117 N.E.2d 314 (1953). It was impos-
sible to bring an action involving nonresidents in a federal court in the state of the accident with-
out a waiver of objections to venue until 1963. Since the venue requirements were not met, neither
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ceased motorist,2"1 and other litigation situations arising out of the negli-
gent or reckless use of automobiles and related activities.2"2
Nonresident motorist statutes operate to require a nonresident to an-
swer for his conduct in the state where there are causes of action alleged
against him. They also operate to provide a claimant with a convenient
method by which he may sue to enforce his rights.20 3 Therefore, nonresi-
dent motorist statutes are another safety valve through which the "transient
rule" can be eliminated.
D. Other Statutes
Nonresident motorist statutes established by Hess led to the enactment
other statutes covering "dangerous" activities such as watercraft opera-
tion2" and aircraft activities.2"5 Another type of statute permitted jurisdic-
tion over nonresidents engaged in selling securities.20 6 These statutes are
based on the fact that the activity involved was one in which the state had a
plaintiff nor defendant resided in the district as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1391. A 1963 amendment
to § 1391, which added a subsection (f), alleviated that problem. The provision permitted a civil
action growing out of a tort involving "manufacture, assembly, repair, ownership, maintenance,
use or operation" of an automobile to be brought in the judicial district where "the act or omission
complained of occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f) (1964). That particular subsection was repealed in
1966 and replaced by amendments to subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1391, which provides that
venue is proper where the claim for relief arose. Id.; see also Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co.,
346 U.S. 338 (1953), where the Court held that venue was improper in a case now covered by 28
U.S.C. § 1391(a).
201. See, e.g., Milam v. Sol Newman Co., 205 F. Supp. 649 (N.D. Ala. 1962) (indicating that
the secretary of state can act as an agent for the deceased nonresident for purposes of process);
Hayden v. Wheeler, 33 Il1. 2d 110, 210 N.E.2d 495 (1965) (remarking that the foreign administra-
tor of a deceased nonresident was held to be a "personal representative" and subject to jurisdiction
in Illinois under its long-arm statute); see also Tolson v. Hodge, 411 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1969);
Stumberg, Extension of Nonresident Motorist Statutes to Those Not Operators, 44 IOWA L. REV.
268, 271-72 (1959); Note, Should Iowa Again "Reach Out"for Estate Representatives of Nonresi-
dent Motorists?, 44 IOWA L. REV. 402 (1959).
202. See Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 294 F.2d 641 (4th Cir. 1961), where the
Fourth Circuit indicated that a state nonresident motorist statute can validly be applied to a
nonresident automobile owner who had never been within the state but authorized the use of her
car within the state; see also Eckman v. Baker, 224 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1955).
203. Hess, 274 U.S. at 356.
204. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.19 (West 1969 & 1989 Supp.). The constitutionality of Louisi-
ana's nonresident watercraft statute was upheld in Goltzman v. Rougeot, 122 F. Supp. 700 (W.D.
La. 1954).
205. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1410 (Purdon 1963). In order for the statute to apply the
activity must occur within that particular state or at least have a causal relationship with that
particular state. But see Peters v. Robin Airlines, 120 N.Y.S.2d 1, 281 App. Div. 903 (1953)
(action dismissed for lack of jurisdiction holding statute violates due process).
206. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-1-16 (Bums 1989 Supp.); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-6 (Mc-
Kinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-63(f)(a) (1989).
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special interest, and therefore had power to be regulated by appropriate
legislation as well as the right to enforce that legislation in its courts.2 7
Due to the development of new bases for asserting jurisdiction over individ-
ual defendants, the jurisdictional reach of courts became substantially
broader than it had been under the strict territorial guidelines of the Pen-
noyer case.
V. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE "TRANSIENT RULE"
In Shaffer v. Heitner,2 °8 the United States Supreme Court held that
physical power over property is no longer always a sufficient basis for exer-
cising jurisdiction over the person. 20 9 The Court stated that the proper re-
quirement is a nexus between the defendant, the controversy, and the
forum.210 The Court rejected the notion that a state may exercise jurisdic-
tion over the person solely on the basis of their presence within the state
and applied instead the "minimum contacts" analysis as described in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington.211 Thus, the "minimum contacts" ap-
proach together with the creation of many statutes, 212 shows little need for
the "transient rule."
Although the "transient rule" has been viewed by some as a simple and
straightforward rule,213 it is also overly broad.21 4 The "transient rule," in
fact, is not simple at all. Rather, it creates even more of a burden on the
courts by requiring them to deal with constitutional questions21 5 and ques-
tions of immunity from service.21' Further, the common law doctrine of
forum non conveniens cannot be properly viewed as a safety valve for the
harshness of the "transient rule. ' 2 1 7
207. Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935). The basis for the decision
was that "Iowa treats the business of dealing in corporate securities as exceptional and subjects it
to special regulation." Id. at 627.
208. 433 U.S. 186, 209 (1977).
209. Id.
210. For a discussion of Shaffer, see supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
211. See International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 310 (1945). For a discussion of
"minimum contacts," see supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 181-207 and accompanying text.
213. See Brilmayer, supra note 6, at 755.
214. Id.
215. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 138-69 and accompanying text.




In Shapiro v. Thompson, 18 the United States Supreme Court indicated
that the right to travel is grounded in the Constitution.219 It is clear, how-
ever, that the "transient rule" has essentially denied the constitutional right
to a defendant who refuses to enter the forum state for fear of being served
with process and thus becoming subject to jurisdiction of the court. 2 °
In the past, when the ability to travel was limited by early forms of
transportation, causes of action usually arose between persons residing in
the same state.2 2 1 The "transient rule" was thus considered to be "fair" in
that normally the defendant was not put in the position of having to defend
an action in a place with which he had no contacts other than his mere
presence.2 22 Today, however, due to the amount and variety of travel, it is
much more likely that cases will arise in which the forum state will have
little or no connection with the litigation. The "transient rule" should be
abolished not only on constitutional grounds, 223 but also because of the
rule's rather consistent violation of the "fairness standard" established in
International Shoe.224
B. Problems of Simplicity
Although the "transient rule" has been recognized as a welcome addi-
tion to our overly complex and litigious society,225 it has in fact been overly
burdensome on the courts.2 26 Rather than allowing the courts to apply the
standard universally the harshness of the "transient rule" has instead forced
the courts to apply standards of immunity to certain individuals who are
only transiently present in the forum state.227 Courts have had to make
rulings on immunity for parties,228 witnesses,229 non-trial situations,23 ° and
218. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
219. Id.
220. See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
221. See Comment, Developments in the Law - State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV.
909, 938 (1960).
222. Id. Another commentator has stated that "the mere presence of the defendant.., is
probably insufficient to support jurisdiction over claims unrelated to his activities within the fo-
rum." Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 160 (1977).
223. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
224. For a discussion of International Shoe, see supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
225. See Brilmayer, supra note 6, at 755.
226. See supra notes 121-80 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 138-69 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
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enticement into the jurisdiction.23' The abolition of the "transient rule"
would relieve courts of the burden of applying such immunity standards.
C. The Problem of Forum Non Conveniens: Is It Really a Safety Valve?
Some courts have upheld transient jurisdiction under the belief that the
doctrine of forum non conveniens232 will prevent abuses of the "transient
rule. ' 233 A few commentators concur with this belief.234 Forum non con-
veniens dismissals, however, are usually made only upon waving certain
defenses in the new forum. 2 35 The doctrine is thus not a safety valve at all.
It can only be used effectively when a forum is seriously inconvenient to a
defendant, irrespective of whether the "transient rule" applies.
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO THE "TRANSIENT RULE"
A. The Use of Statutes
Most commentators agree that state long-arm statutes23 6 are a necessity
in today's complex and litigious society.237 Statutes covering corporate23
8
and individual239 acts or omissions, along with nonresident motorist, 24° air-
craft activities, 24 ' and watercraft operation242 will operate as substitutes for
the harsh "transient rule. ' 243 These statutes not only encourage the joinder
of all parties to the dispute, including those who are nonresidents of the
state, but also promote the modem policy of disposing of complex or mul-
tiparty disputes in one suit.2' Further, long-arm statutes "promote the de-
termination of jurisdictional questions on the basis of the relationship of
[the] defendant and the dispute to the forum state .... .1245 They are, there-
231. See supra notes 158-69 and accompanying text.
232. For a definition and discussion of the doctrine forum non conveniens, see supra notes
170-80 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 271 (5th Cir. 1985);
Aluminal Indus., Inc. v. Newtown Commercial Ass'n, 89 F.R.D. 326, 329-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
234. See, e.g., Bernstine, supra note 6, at 66; Ehrenzweig, supra note 3, at 305.
235. See, e.g., Opert v. Schmid, 535 F. Supp. 591, 594-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
236. See supra notes 181-207 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 186.
238. See supra note 183.
239. See supra notes 188 and 192.
240. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 205.
242. See supra note 204.
243. The substitution must be done along with "minimum contact" analysis in International
Shoe.
244. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 1068, at 336.
245. Id.
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fore, better adapted to take into consideration fairness and convenience fac-
tors than the Pennoyer philosophy with its reliance on territorial power.
B. The Use of "Minimum Contacts"
The "minimum contacts" analysis of International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton,2 4 6 implemented by state long-arm statutes, is a sufficient means for as-
suring jurisdiction in those cases where the defendant's transient presence is
related to other contacts with the forum state.147 These methods were not
available when the territorial power theory was announced.248
In International Shoe, however, Chief Justice Stone firmly established
that:
Whether due process is satisfied must depend... upon the quality
and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly adminis-
tration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process
clause to insure. That clause does not contemplate that a state may
make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or cor-
porate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties or
relations.249
It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that "minimum contacts" pro-
mote fairness and are consistent with the fourteenth amendment.250
In World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,251 the Supreme Court did
not directly address the issue of whether service in the forum by itself con-
fers jurisdiction. Justice White, however, did discuss the paramount im-
portance of "minimum contacts":
246. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
247. For a discussion of the "minimum contacts" analysis as outlined in International Shoe,
see supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
248. The "territorial power" theory was established in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722
(1878); see supra note 4.
249. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
250. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
251. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
252. Id. World- Wide was a products liability action stemming from an automobile accident
in Oklahoma. Plaintiffs had purchased the automobile in New York while they were New York
residents, and were passing through Oklahoma on their way to a new home in Arizona when the
accident occurred. Suit was brought in an Oklahoma state court against the automobile's manu-
facturer, its importer, its regional distributor, and its retail dealer. The regional distributor,
World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation (World-Wide), and the retail dealer Seaway Volkswagen,
Inc. (Seaway), entered special appearances claiming that the forum's assertion of jurisdiction over
them would offend the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 288.
World-Wide was a New York corporation distributing vehicles, parts, and accessories to re-
tailers in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. Seaway also was incorporated in New York,
where it had its sole place of business. Although neither company did business in Oklahoma, the
trial court rejected the defendants' constitutional claims. Id. at 289. The Oklahoma Supreme
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The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform
two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant
against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.
And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not
reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coe-
qual sovereigns in a federal system.25 3
Thus, it seems that "minimum contacts" have been stressed by courts more
and more as being extremely important. So important that they must be
used to promote fairness in all circumstances, even those where an individ-
ual is only transiently present in the forum state.
VII. THE ABOLITION OF THE "TRANSIENT RULE": ITS EFFECTS ON
PLAINTIFFS, DEFENDANTS AND THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
If the "transient rule" were abolished, the judicial system would become
more fair and efficient.2 54 Only one commentator to date has attempted to
outline the possible ramifications of the "transient rule's" abolishment. 5
Although it is difficult to predict the future ramifications that would arise if
the "transient rule" were abolished, the following is an attempt to predict
the practical and primary impact upon plaintiffs, defendants and the judi-
cial system.
A. Effects on the Plaintiffs
If the "transient rule" were abolished, plaintiffs would be forced to file
their claims in a number of jurisdictions in order to ensure that the statute
of limitations was tolled.256 There would also be an increase in the amount
of expenses incurred by the plaintiff due to filing fees.257 On the other hand,
Court denied defendants a writ of prohibition to restrain the trial judge from exercising in per-
sonam jurisdiction over them and held that personal jurisdiction was authorized by the state's
long-arm statute. Id.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, refusing to allow personal jurisdiction based "on
one, isolated occurrence and whatever inferences can be drawn therefrom: the fortuitous circum-
stance that a single Audi automobile, sold in New York to New York residents, happened to
suffer an accident while passing through Oklahoma." Id. at 295.
253. Id. at 291-92.
254. Some commentators have interpreted Shaffer as abolishing the "transient rule;" see, eg.,
Casad, supra note 186, at 47; Sedler, supra note 6, at 1035. But see Bernstine, supra note 6, at 47;
Brilmayer, supra note 6, at 752; Fyr, supra note 6, at 770-72; Zammit, supra note 6, at 23-4; Note,
supra note 6, 713 n.3.
255. See Posnak, supra note 3, at 748-70.
256. The term "tolled" means to suspend or stop temporarily the running of the statute of
limitations. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1334 (5th ed. 1979).
257. The costs may go even higher if there is a need to litigate the jurisdiction issue.
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it is certain that a plaintiff generally has at least one forum, if not several, in
which to sue the defendant. 25 8
Although at first glance the abolition of the "transient rule" would seem
to cause a tremendous disadvantage to plaintiffs, certain advantages would
result. Plaintiffs often waste considerable expense and energy serving the
defendant.259 They will also be relieved of penalties issued by courts for
technical defects of quashing service.26 ° In addition, there would be fewer
instances in which the plaintiff is deprived of his or her day in court because
of the defendant's avoidance of service of process.261
B. Effects on the Defendants
Defendants would receive many benefits if the "transient rule" were
abolished. Potential defendants would not have to ensure that they were
immune from service before entering the forum.262  Extinguishing the
"transient rule" would also relieve the need for a defendant to give up a
potential claim or defense while being subject to jurisdiction in an inconve-
nient forum. 263 Further, defendants would not suffer deprivation of their
constitutional right to interstate travel.2 4
If "transient rule" were abolished, it would also be less likely for defend-
ants to be subjected to an unfair choice of law.265 In addition, more defend-
ants would be relieved of the humiliation of being served when they are in
the company of others.2 66 Finally, the abolition of the "transient rule"
would relieve the pressure on defendants who are forced to settle their suits
258. See Posnak, supra note 3, at 749.
259. Lacy, supra note 6, at 514. This result, however, could be avoided if the International
Shoe standard along with state long-arm statutes were used by a prudent attorney to determine
alternative bases of jurisdiction and alternative means of supplying notice.
260. See Lacy, supra note 6, at 512-13.
261. Id. at 514.
262. See supra notes 138-69 and accompanying text.
263. See Posnak, supra note 3, at 760-61.
264. See supra notes 128-37, 218-24 and accompanying text.
265. This curtailment of forum shopping could be the difference between whether the plaintiff
will win or lose the lawsuit. On the other hand, although this result is theoretically possible, it is
unlikely. If the forum in which the defendant was served has no legitimate interest in the litiga-
tion, it could not constitutionally apply its own substantive law unless it coincided with the law of
some interested state. See AllState Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Home Ins. Co. v.
Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). There might be some rare situations when denying jurisdiction to the
forum in which the defendant is served might result in denying a body of law favorable to the
plaintiff. Nevertheless, it is a dubious proposition that the courts should encourage this type of
forum shopping. See Posnak, supra note 3, at 752 n.99. Similarly, the plaintiff's ability to shop for
a forum where jurors and judges are perceived as more favorable would also be curtailed. This is
the appropriate position for courts to take. See id. at 753.
266. See Posnak, supra note 3, at 764.
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due to the inconvenience and expense of litigating either a jurisdictional
question 67 or a trial itself in such an inconvenient forum.
C. Effects on the Judicial System
The judicial system would also benefit if the "transient rule" were abol-
ished. Those issues dealing with whether the defendant was immune from
service because he was in the forum in connection with other litigation,2
or because he was enticed into the forum,2 6 9 could be avoided. These issues
generally take a considerable amount of judicial energy to resolve.27 0
If the "transient rule" were abolished, there would also be fewer occa-
sions for a court to consider the issue of forum non conveniens2 71 This
may represent a significant conservation of judicial time, energy and ex-
pense because resolution of the forum non conveniens issue frequently re-
quires numerous factual determinations to be made, and a subjective
balancing of necessary interests.272
In addition, the judicial system would not have to be as concerned with
whether a proper person served the process, 2 73 the person served was au-
thorized to receive the process,274 service was at the proper location,275 or
the proper manner of service was followed.2 76 Further, if the "transient
rule" were abolished, there would be a reduction of court costs. 2 7 7
267. Aware of the expense that would be incurred to litigate in the forum, some prudent
defendants may choose to default or settle despite their beliefs that they have good defenses on the
merits and that they could prevail in having their cases dismissed on the grounds of forum non
conveniens. For a discussion of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, see supra notes 170-80 and
accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 138-57 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 158-69 and accompanying text.
270. The judicial energy that is expended can be appreciated by the volume of cases on the
topic. See supra notes 138-69 and accompanying text; see also 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note 6, §§ 1076-81.
271. For a discussion of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, see supra notes 170-80 and
accompanying text.
272. Id. The court would also be relieved of even having to decide the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.
273. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 1089.
274. Id. §§ 1094, 1074-1111.
275. Id. § 1096.
276. Id. § 1095. This would be limited to the extent necessary to determine whether the
attempt at notice was "reasonably calculated" to give defendant actual notice of the lawsuit. See
also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
277. See Posnak, supra note 3, at 766.
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Although the parties may cover the costs of personal service to a certain
extent, the system inevitably must absorb some of these costs.2 7
Finally, if the "transient rule" were abolished, it would "no longer be
necessary [for the courts] to spend any time on motions to quash raising
purely formal objection." '2 79 As the Court noted in Shaffer, "the fairness
standard of International Shoe can be easily applied in the vast majority of
cases."28 It also seems that the "fairness standard" from International
Shoe will become easier to apply as more experience is gained from utilizing
it.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The "transient rule" has overstayed its welcome. It was originally de-
veloped based on the rationale that the states had complete authority over
persons and things within their borders.281 Transient jurisdiction, however,
once thought to be a simple and efficient vehicle for our litigious society,
has compelled courts to decide difficult and time consuming issues of immu-
nity from service of process.282 The United States Supreme Court has es-
tablished a "minimum contacts" standard283 that can be used along with
state long-arm statutes284 to act as a "fair" alternative to the "transient
rule."
These substitutes should be used for a number of reasons. First, they
are consistent with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment285
and the constitutional right to interstate travel.286 Second, they would
lessen the flood of litigation due to immunity and service of process is-
sues.287 Finally, they would have a positive effect on plaintiffs, defendants,
and the judicial system.288
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278. For example, the fees paid to the marshall or sheriff who serve process are greater than
the amount charged to the parties to have the process served.
279. Lacy, supra note 6, at 517.
280. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211.
281. See supra note 4.
282. See supra notes 138-69 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 246-53 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 181-207 and 236-45 and accompanying text.
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286. See supra notes 128-37 and 218-24 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 138-69 and accompanying text.
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